Germany to become military superpower

Germany Must Have Stronger Army Than Britain, Says Merz

Chancellor Commits to Meeting Trump’s Demand That NATO Members Spend 5% of GDP on Defence

Germany must possess a stronger military force than the United Kingdom, its chancellor has declared, as he made a firm commitment to allocating 5 per cent of the nation’s annual GDP to defence spending.

In his inaugural major address to the German parliament, Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated emphatically: “We must make all the means available that the Bundeswehr needs so that it can become the strongest conventional army in Europe.”

His remarks strongly indicate that Germany, which has for many decades demonstrated profound reluctance to rearm due to its troubling Nazi past, now harbours ambitions to surpass the foremost armies of Europe: Britain, Poland and France, in terms of military capability and strength.

Johann Wadephul, serving as Mr Merz’s foreign minister, confirmed that Berlin stands prepared to commit to the substantial defence spending target of 5 per cent of annual GDP, as demanded by Donald Trump, the US president. He explicitly stated that Germany would “follow him there” in relation to this significant spending commitment.

Mr Trump has been actively lobbying NATO members to meet this ambitious spending target, with Estonia and Poland having already pledged their commitment to reaching this substantial figure.

This percentage represents double the United Kingdom’s current aim to spend 2.5 per cent of GDP on defence annually by 2027, a target that has been the subject of considerable debate within British political circles regarding its adequacy in the face of growing global threats.

Germany has solemnly vowed to transform itself into a major European security power in direct response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a process that necessitates massive reinvestment in the Bundeswehr after decades of neglect and underfunding.

Historical Context of German Military Decline

For numerous decades, the German army suffered profoundly from a critical lack of investment and inadequate equipment, intrinsically linked to a prevailing belief in Berlin that defence was no longer a priority in the post-Cold War era of European integration and peaceful cooperation.

This systematic neglect reached such an alarming extent that German soldiers were once compelled to participate in a NATO exercise using broomsticks in place of proper military equipment, an incident that became emblematic of the dire state of the Bundeswehr’s readiness and capability.

Olaf Scholz, Mr Merz’s predecessor as chancellor, attempted to address this troubling situation by establishing a special fund of €100 billion (equivalent to approximately £84 billion) specifically designated to restore the might and operational capability of the German army, a move that was widely regarded as a watershed moment in post-war German defence policy.

Merz’s Bold New Direction

Mr Merz has demonstrated his determination to go significantly further by taking the unprecedented step of scrapping Germany’s famously strict borrowing limits on the defence sector, with military projects that cost more than 1 per cent of GDP now eligible for unlimited funding, effectively removing financial constraints on major defence initiatives.

His government is also giving serious consideration to reinstating conscription, which was abandoned by Germany in 2011 after being a cornerstone of the country’s defence policy for decades. This potential return to mandatory military service would be implemented if a newly proposed voluntary scheme of military service for young people fails to attract sufficient recruits to meet the Bundeswehr’s expanding personnel requirements.

A comprehensive major rearmament programme for the country would not merely require tens of thousands more troops to bolster the Bundeswehr’s ranks, but would also necessitate substantially increased production of sophisticated weapon systems, including long-range Taurus missiles, advanced Leopard 2 battle tanks, and cutting-edge IRIS-T missile defence systems.

The German army would additionally need to undertake the extensive task of rebuilding dilapidated barracks and military facilities that have fallen into disrepair, as well as substantially upgrading the nation’s crumbling transport infrastructure network, which senior military officials fear is woefully inadequate for the rapid deployment and transportation of troops and heavy equipment such as tanks to the eastern flank of NATO territory in the event of a crisis.

Comparative Military Strengths

The Bundeswehr currently consists of approximately 180,000 regular soldiers, representing a considerably larger force than the British Armed Forces’ total of just over 135,000 regular troops, which has been steadily declining in recent decades due to successive rounds of defence cuts and restructuring. When taking into account reservist forces, the Bundeswehr claims to have almost a million soldiers potentially at its disposal, a significant legacy of its long-standing national service programme that provided basic military training to generations of German citizens.

By comparison, the French military maintains approximately 200,000 active soldiers, plus an additional 41,000 reservists, whilst the Polish military has more than 200,000 active duty soldiers supplemented by roughly 40,000 reservists, making it one of the largest land forces in NATO.

In terms of heavy equipment, Germany presently possesses 296 battle tanks, a figure that exceeds the current British stockpile of 213 tanks, of which fewer than 150 are believed to be in a fully serviceable operational condition, according to detailed analysis conducted by the data website Statista and other defence observers.

Poland maintains the highest number of tanks at the ready amongst European NATO members, with an impressive 614 operational battle tanks, while France maintains a fleet of 215 main battle tanks of various models and configurations.

Germany has also notably overtaken the United Kingdom in total military spending in 2024, according to a comprehensive recent report compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, marking a significant shift in the European defence hierarchy that has traditionally been dominated by Britain and France.

Qualitative Considerations

Despite these quantitative advantages, military experts and defence analysts still widely consider the British Army’s level of combat experience, operational readiness, and quality of training to be demonstrably superior to Germany’s forces, which have had limited combat deployments in recent decades and have focused primarily on peacekeeping and stabilisation missions rather than high-intensity warfare.

A crucial differentiating factor is that, unlike Germany, Britain maintains its own independent nuclear weapons programme, Trident, which serves as the ultimate military deterrent and is believed to comprise around 60 nuclear missiles carried by four Vanguard-class submarines operating on continuous at-sea deterrence patrols.

In terms of naval power, the United Kingdom’s surface fleet consists of 52 warships of various classes, whereas Germany’s naval forces maintain between 30 and 40 surface vessels, according to comprehensive analysis conducted by The Telegraph’s defence correspondents. The UK also possesses nine submarines – including four ballistic missile submarines and five nuclear-powered attack submarines – surpassing Germany’s fleet of six conventional diesel-electric submarines.

Germany technically possesses no nuclear missiles of its own, as it has never developed an indigenous nuclear weapons programme, consistent with its post-war policies and international commitments. However, it does host an unspecified number of American nuclear missiles at designated military bases within its territory – estimated to be at least 20 according to some defence analysts – but crucially has no operational control over these weapons, which remain under exclusive US command and authority.

Expanding European Security Role

As part of its concerted efforts to play a substantially more prominent role in European security architecture, the German armed forces have recently assumed command of a newly established NATO mission specifically designed to protect the strategically vital Baltic Sea region from potential Russian saboteurs and hybrid warfare activities.

This mission, officially designated as Task Force Baltic, has implemented significantly increased surveillance measures and naval patrols throughout the area, with the primary objective of deterring and, if necessary, intercepting vessels suspected of attempting to sabotage or damage critical undersea infrastructure such as telecommunications cables and energy pipelines.

Senior officers serving in the German navy have also adopted a noticeably more assertive and bullish tone towards Russia in recent months, reflecting a broader shift in German strategic thinking and military posture.

Speaking to The Telegraph in February, Stephan Haisch, a rear admiral in the German navy, stated that it was a “good sign” that increased German military activity in the Baltic region was “bothering” Russia, suggesting a new willingness to confront Russian provocations and intimidation tactics.

Psychological Readiness Concerns

Despite these developments, some prominent German leaders and political figures have expressed serious concerns that, from a psychological and societal perspective, the country may not be adequately prepared for the potential realities of armed conflict – and perhaps never will be, given its historical experiences and the profound impact of two world wars on the national consciousness.

Joachim Gauck, who served as German president from 2012 to 2017, suggested last month that Germans as a society had potentially become too mentally unprepared to cope with the harsh realities of warfare after experiencing many decades of peace, prosperity, and security within the European project and NATO alliance.

In a revealing conversation with Philipp Sandmann, a prominent German newsletter publisher, Gauck observed: “What concerns me deeply is not just a military weakness but a mental one, that we are not sufficiently prepared – not just technically, but in terms of emotion, morality and politics. We need to develop and embrace a new seriousness about defence matters.”

Bilateral Cooperation Initiatives

Later on Thursday, in a significant development for European defence cooperation, Germany and Britain jointly announced an ambitious new collaborative project to develop advanced long-range missile systems, building upon their recently established Trinity House security pact, which aims to deepen defence and security cooperation between the two major European powers.

As part of this expanding bilateral defence relationship, Germany will also source British-made military bridging equipment to enhance the nation’s critical infrastructure capabilities, particularly for rapid deployment scenarios, the two countries’ defence ministries announced in a coordinated statement.

This collaboration represents an important step in strengthening NATO’s European pillar at a time of heightened tension with Russia and growing uncertainty about the future trajectory of American security commitments to Europe under the Trump administration.

Industrial and Economic Implications

The substantial increase in German defence spending will have significant implications for Europe’s defence industrial base. German arms manufacturers such as Rheinmetall have already seen their stock prices soar in anticipation of major procurement contracts, and the company has announced plans to dramatically expand production capacity for ammunition, vehicles, and other military equipment.

Germany’s push to become Europe’s leading military power also raises important questions about the future division of security responsibilities within NATO and the European Union. While some European partners welcome Germany’s willingness to shoulder more of the collective defence burden, others remain wary of German military predominance given historical sensitivities.

The economic impact of dedicating 5 per cent of GDP to defence would be substantial for Germany, requiring either significant reductions in other areas of government spending or increased borrowing and taxation. Economic analysts have pointed out that such a dramatic shift in fiscal priorities would fundamentally alter Germany’s post-war economic model, which has traditionally emphasised fiscal restraint and limited military expenditure.

Public Opinion and Political Debate

German public opinion regarding military spending and the country’s role in European security has undergone a significant transformation since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Polls indicate that a majority of Germans now support increased defence spending and a more assertive security posture, marking a dramatic shift from the pacifist tendencies that have characterised German society for decades.

However, the proposed level of 5 per cent of GDP remains controversial, with opposition parties questioning whether such an enormous financial commitment is sustainable or necessary. The left-wing Die Linke party has been particularly vocal in opposing what it describes as “militarisation,” while even within Merz’s governing coalition, debates continue about the appropriate balance between military spending and other national priorities such as climate action and social welfare.

Implications for European Security Architecture

Germany’s ambition to develop Europe’s strongest conventional military force represents a fundamental reconfiguration of the continent’s security architecture, which has traditionally relied heavily on British and French military capabilities supplemented by American security guarantees.

Defence analysts suggest that if Germany successfully implements its planned military expansion, it could precipitate a significant shift in NATO’s internal power dynamics, potentially creating a new “big three” of European defence comprising Germany, France, and Poland, with the UK’s relative influence potentially diminished despite its nuclear capability and permanent UN Security Council seat.

The long-term strategic implications of this shift remain uncertain, but what is clear is that Europe’s security landscape is undergoing its most significant transformation since the end of the Cold War, driven by the twin catalysts of Russian aggression and American pressure for greater European self-reliance in defence matters.